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Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my vote on the motion to discharge S.J. Res. 54. This resolution is a joint resolution to direct the removal of the U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by this Congress.
As my colleagues well know, since March of 2017, I have focused on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and ending the civil war that has made it so much worse. During that time period, I have spent as much time as anyone I can conceive of here on Capitol Hill focusing on this humanitarian tragedy in Yemen--this national security disaster. I have studied all sides of this issue and have tried to approach it with the seriousness it deserves.
Before saying where I am going to come down on today's vote, I wish to discuss why I opposed S.J. Res. 54 in March, what has happened since then, and why I plan to vote the way I do today.
In March, I voted to table S.J. Res. 54. In a speech here on the Senate floor on March 20, I explained my three reasons for doing so at that time.
First, I expressed concern that the bill hadn't been considered and marked up by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member.
Second, I said that it would never become law because the administration has threatened to veto it, and even if Congress were able to override a veto, I said it would fail to achieve its stated objective, because the administration rejects the premise that the legislation is related to hostilities in Yemen.
Third, I said I wanted to introduce legislation that could actually pass and provide the administration with the leverage it needs to pressure the Government of Saudi Arabia to do two things: No. 1, end the civil war in Yemen, and, No. 2, improve the humanitarian situation.
What has transpired since then? Well, I, along with Senators Shaheen, Collins, and Coons, introduced S.J. Res. 58 on April 11.
Our bill required the Secretary of State to repeatedly certify the Government of Saudi Arabia is taking urgent steps to end the civil war in Yemen, alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and reduce the risk to civilians. If he cannot make these written, detailed, and unclassified certifications, the legislation would prohibit U.S. air refueling for Saudi-led coalition aircraft, conducting missions exclusively focused on the civil war in Yemen.
We, in a bipartisan way, worked successfully to ensure the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee passed versions of our legislation. We then worked, in a bipartisan way, to ensure it was included in the National Defense Authorization Act as section 1290, which the President of the United States signed into law.
In September, pursuant to section 1290, Secretary of State Pompeo sent to Congress the required submission regarding Saudi actions in Yemen. Secretary Pompeo chose not to use the national security waiver and instead certified that Saudi Arabia was indeed taking urgent steps to end the civil war in Yemen, to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and to reduce risk to civilians.
There were numerous problems with the Secretary of State's certifications. No. 1, the Secretary certified that Saudi Arabia was undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations in Yemen. That was not a credible certification because we saw in the preceding months a dramatic increase in civilian casualties and deaths.
No. 2, the Secretary certified that the Saudis were complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States. That also was not a credible certification because the Secretary's own memorandum of justification for the section 1290 submission explicitly said the Saudis were not doing so. The document was directly and explicitly self-contradictory.
In summary, as a group of us wrote in a letter I led on October 10 to our Secretary of State, it was ``difficult to reconcile known facts with at least two of [the] certifications.'' In other words, the Secretary's September section 1290 certification--the law of the land, a statute signed into law by the President of the United States--was not credible.
Despite repeated requests for answers to our questions regarding Saudi Arabia and Yemen, we couldn't get responsive or timely answers from the administration. After repeatedly calling for the administration to do so, I appreciated the decision to no longer provide air refueling to the Saudis in Yemen. Again, I appreciated that decision. However, I was disappointed the administration didn't use section 1290 to end the air refueling.
Why is this important? Such an approach would have demonstrated respect for the law and this article I branch of government. It would have also provided the administration additional leverage to persuade the Saudis to support our objectives--not the Saudi's objectives, our objectives--in Yemen.
I also thought the claim the Saudis requested to end the refueling was, shall I say, lamentable. In our October 10 letter, seven of us-- again, a bipartisan group--asked for answers on a number of questions related to Saudi Arabia and Yemen and the section 1290 certification. We asked for a response by October 31.
Failing to receive those answers from the administration on November 15, more than 2 weeks after that deadline, I worked with Ranking Member Menendez to introduce the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2018, S. 3652. Among other things, this bill seeks to ensure effective congressional oversight of U.S. policy on Yemen, provide leverage to push the stakeholders in Yemen's civil war toward a political process, and address the world's worst humanitarian crisis. I am told this is the worst crisis since the 1940s.
Yesterday, the day before a potential vote on this legislation, we finally received a response to the October 10 letter. It was late, and it was unresponsive. For me, the briefing today with Secretaries Pompeo and Mattis, though appreciated, raised more questions than it answered.
Let me now turn to today's vote. Recall my reasons for voting to table this bill in March. I wanted legislation to go through the Foreign Relations Committee, and I wanted something that could actually become law. With the support of the chairman and the ranking member, that is exactly what we did with my legislation, which ultimately became section 1290 of the Defense bill and was signed into law.
Unfortunately, as I have laid out, the administration did not take that law seriously, and it submitted a certification with highly troubling and problematic elements. That puts me in a very different place than last March. Plus, with 14 million people on the verge of starvation in Yemen and things getting worse by the day, there is no time to lose. I believe the Senate must speak clearly that we expect all parties--all parties--to the civil war to come urgently to the negotiating table to end the civil war.
Let me lay out my thoughts on Iran in the big picture. There is, of course, Iranian influence in Yemen. Iran is the world's worst state sponsor of terrorism, and Iran has played an immoral and illegal role in Yemen. I will take a backseat to no one as an Iran hawk.
I have studied the situation in Yemen as closely as anyone, and I believe the best way to oppose Iran and Yemen and stop ballistic missile attacks on our partners is to bring all parties to the negotiating table, to end this civil war, and to address the humanitarian crisis.
Famine and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians will only push more Yemenis toward Iran and its proxies, giving Tehran increased opportunities to threaten Americans, our allies, and our interests.
If you are not sure about this, ask yourself the following questions: Does Iran have more or less influence in Yemen now than it did a year ago or than it did when the civil war started? Will Iran have more or less influence in Yemen if the civil war continues indefinitely?
Solely from an anti-Iran perspective, I think an objective assessment of those questions demonstrates the need to end the civil war and the need to pursue an inclusive political solution that seeks to drive a wedge between the Houthis and Tehran.
In addition, there is no way we are going to make any real or sustainable progress in the world's worst humanitarian crisis unless we end the civil war. Ending the civil war would also allow us to focus more effectively on isolating and killing members of ISIS and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.
To counter Iran, to help 14 million people on the verge of starvation, and to more effectively go after ISIS and AQAP, we need the civil war over now. The United States has leverage with the Saudis to help bring this about, and we need to use all of that leverage immediately. We have not done so thus far.
Since March of 2017, I have tried to give the administration all the leverage it needs to accomplish the outcomes I have laid out. The administration has failed to fully utilize the leverage I provided, and so I have no choice. Based on that history, based on those facts, based on our national security interests, based on our humanitarian principles, I plan to support S.J. Res. 54 today.
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