Nscai Report

Floor Speech

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Mr. MENENDEZ. This landmark report and its important recommendations are the result of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which established the NSCAI as an independent commission ``to consider the methods and means necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.''

In March 2021, the Commission submitted its final report to Congress and the President, in part, warning of the dangers of the Chinese Government obtaining the personal genetic information of U.S. citizens and the importance of ensuring U.S. leadership in biotechnology. As we complete our work on the United States Innovation and Competition Act that will enable us to maintain our technological edge over China, it is imperative that we acknowledge the findings of this Commission regarding the critical importance of securing our biodata from China and its agents. To that end, allow me to cite warnings and recommendations directly from this Commission. I hope our State Department leadership, including Secretary Blinken, take these into serious consideration and put them into action.

On Page 53, the report finds: ``[China understands the tremendous upside associated with leading the bio revolution. Massive genomic data sets at places like BGI Group (formerly known as the Beijing Genomics Institute), coupled with China's now-global genetic data collection platform and ``all-of-nation'' approach to AI, will make them a formidable competitor in the bio realm. BGI may be serving, wittingly or unwittingly, as a global collection mechanism for Chinese government genetic databases, providing China with greater raw numbers and diversity of human genome samples, as well as access to sensitive personal information about key individuals around the world. The United States cannot afford to look back in 10 years and be ``surprised'' by the biotechnology equivalent of Huawei.]''

Later, on Page 586, the report finds: ``[BGI has also benefited from substantial support from the Chinese government, as well as its 2013 acquisition of a competing U.S. firm, Complete Genomics. There are indications that BGI's links with the Chinese government may run deeper than it publicly claims, as it built and operates China National GeneBank, the Chinese government's national genetic database, and has used PLA-owned supercomputers to process genetic information. Chinese diplomats have pushed BGI-built COVID-19 testing kits, including in the United States, and by August 2020 BGI had ``sold 35 million rapid COVID-19 testing kits to 180 countries, and built 58 labs in 18 countries.'' The highest levels of the United States government should publicly state these concerns so as to raise awareness among the U.S. commercial and academic biotechnology communities, as well as U.S. allies, many of which currently have partnerships or business dealings with BGI.]''

The Commission then recommends on Page 587 that the State Department design a specific initiative to warn America and its allies about BGI. ``[Launch a strategic communications campaign to publicly highlight the links between the Chinese government and BGI. The Secretary of State should personally voice concern about BGI's ties to the Chinese government and instruct the Department to conduct a strategic communications campaign to highlight those links and warn of the dangers of the Chinese government obtaining personal genetic information via BGI. The Department should also warn BGI and the Chinese government that it will closely monitor BGI's activities, and that should BGI be utilized as a mass DNA-collection apparatus for the Chinese government, it could face additional U.S. regulatory action.]''

It is important to note that two subsidiaries of BGI were placed on the entity list by the Commerce Department last year for their role in aiding the genocide being perpetrated by the Chinese Government against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, an issue that I and many of my Senate colleagues have been vocal on.

In closing, I think it is important that this report be part of our Record today.

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