-9999

Floor Speech

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a very serious problem: viral gain-of-function research. I am calling on this body to place a pause on all viral gain-of-function research, just like President Obama did in 2014.

Maybe I will start with an analogy. Could you imagine the United States participating in nuclear research and sending our scientists, sending our money to foreign adversaries to help them with their nuclear weapons research right now--say, a country like Iran or a country like North Korea? Of course, no one in this body would suggest that is a smart thing to do. But people can't see what viral gain-of- function is, so they are not afraid of it, but they should be.

Think about this: Nuclear bombs have killed 2-, 3-, maybe 400,000 people at the max--2-, 3-, maybe 400,000 people--but viral gain-of- function research, through COVID, has killed over 1 million Americans, and worldwide, it is at least 10 times that, maybe 20 times that. And we still have 15 million long COVID sufferers, but we continue to fund and we continue to participate in viral gain-of-function research. I would stop and ask this body, what do we have to show for it? Thirty years of viral gain-of-function research and what are the benefits? What have we benefited from this?

Just like in January of 2020 when I was the first Member of Congress to sound the alarm on the COVID virus and the consequences and the pandemic that was coming, I am here once again to sound this alarm.

Think about this: Why is this a concern to anybody? First of all, I want to talk about the risk of lab leaks. No matter what virus security level this research is done in, there is going to be risk of a lab leak. There is human error, there is mechanical error, people not following protocols. We have seen it over and over again, and that is actually what led to the pause in 2014 by President Obama.

Laboratories, regardless of their biosafety levels, are not infallible. Human error, equipment failure, unforeseen accidents can lead to the escape of enhanced pathogens into the general population. The consequences of such an event have proven to be catastrophic. We witnessed this firsthand through the COVID-19 pandemic, just how fast a virus could spread throughout the world. A virus that is engineered to be more contagious or more deadly can cause an even more severe global death crisis, even worse than what we saw with COVID-19.

Something people seldom talk about is the threat of bioresearch, of biosecurity when it comes to our food supply. Just like the Chinese developed a COVID virus to attack human lungs, they could develop new viruses that could attack our beef cattle, our pigs, our dairy. They could find new viruses to attack the wheat in Kansas. All these things are very feasible by viral gain-of-function research.

I am very concerned about the risk of weaponization of these viruses, that all of these have a military potential, what we would call bioterrorism. Everything has a dual purpose. In America, we don't think about that. We always think about science being research for the good, but what we have found over and over is that rogue nations can use this type of research for the very, very worse.

I just want to dive a little bit deeper into this subject and this threat of bioterrorism. Knowledge and techniques developed through gain-of-function research can be potentially misused by malicious actors. If detailed methodologies for enhancing pathogens are published or otherwise become accessible, they could be easy exploited to create biological weapons. These could be created by people with minimal means. They are called terrorists. They wouldn't have to go through the hassle, the time and expense of developing a nuclear weapon; they could more easily develop biological weapons that are even more deadly. The potential for such misuse makes the dissemination of research findings in this bill particularly perilous, and it lowers the barrier for entry for those who might wish to cause us harm.

Ethically, gain-of-function research raises significant questions. Is it morally acceptable to create pathogens with pandemic potential, knowing the immense suffering they could cause if accidentally or, heaven forbid, deliberately released?

The scientific pursuit of knowledge must be balanced with responsibility and awareness of their broader consequences. The principles that I swore an oath to as a physician--do no harm; above all, do no harm--should guide every one of our actions when we are funding science. Yet, gain-of-function research walks a tightrope between potential benefits and catastrophic risks.

Public trust in science and research institutes is another critical aspect. Higher profile accidents or ethical breaches have eroded public confidence, making it even more difficult to garner support for necessary scientific endeavors. Transparency, accountability, and stringent regulatory frameworks are essential to maintaining this trust.

That is why we are here today calling for this body to pass our Viral Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act. Our bill will prohibit the funding of this research, allowing time for an honest conversation about the pros and cons of gain-of-function research, setting up guardrails that ensure a system of checks and balances.

Getting transparency for the American people for what happened during the pandemic shouldn't be controversial. I hope my colleagues will join me in agreeing that if we can't measure it, we can't manage it-- especially when we are discussing the creation of lethal viruses at the taxpayers' expense.

The Federal Government should not provide another dime in funding for viral gain-of-function research in the deceptive name of global health and national security.

For these reasons, I am proud to be back here on the Senate floor to sound the alarm again and call for the immediate passage of our bill, the Viral Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act.

I want to conclude by thanking Senators Braun and Lee for their support of this resolution, and we look forward to continuing the discussion on this issue with their colleagues.

As if in legislative session and notwithstanding rule XXII, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 718, which is at the desk; further, that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, and that the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. President, certainly I understand the Senator from Massachusetts' comments and his concerns. I would still continue to argue that the benefits have not outweighed the risk. We have not seen any benefits from this type of research.

The whole concept, just going back to what the definition of ``viral gain-of-function research'' is--we wouldn't do it if it is causing potential for harm, but we can still continue to research flu vaccines. We can continue to research avian influenza. There are all sorts of things we could do. But let's not make avian influenza worse. Let's not put a protein spike on it that is going to make it stick to human lung cells like they did with SARS-CoV-1.

The justification of gain-of-function research hinges on its purported benefits, as you described, such as improved preparedness for pandemics; however, it is important to scrutinize whether these benefits are indeed reliable and they outweigh the risks.

Critics argue that the knowledge gained from such research can often be obtained through safer means, such as computational models or studying natural outbreaks. Moreover, these resources invested in high- risk research can be redirected toward strengthening public health infrastructure, improving our surveillance system, and developing broad-spectrum antivirals and vaccines.

Let's quit throwing good money after bad money. Let's take good care of the American taxpayer dollars and actually do things that are going to protect them from future pandemics.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Source