Saudi Arabia: Minority's New Ally
Floor Speech
Mr. CONNOLLY of Virginia. Madam Speaker, the minority party has a new ally in its effort to obstruct clean energy legislation--the Saudi Arabian Government.
Here in the House I was proud to join my colleagues in passing legislation that would invest in clean energy technology, create new green jobs, and cut global warming pollution. Those same countries on whose foreign oil we are currently dependent are not supportive of legislation that would do these things.
As The New York Times reported on October 14--an article I will enter into the Record--Saudi Arabia will go to the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen with the goal of preventing ratification of an effective international treaty to reduce greenhouse gas pollution precisely because such a treaty would reduce American reliance on its oil.
The Senate is considering a bill analogous to what we already passed here in the House to cut global warming pollution and reduce our dependence on foreign oil. I hope Saudi Arabia's opposition to American energy independence will remind all of us how important it is for the Senate to act, and act now.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 14, 2009]
``Striving for No'' in Climate Talks
(By Andrew C. Revkin)
UNFCCC Amid the throngs at climate talks, as shown in Bali here in 2007, officials from individual countries can make a big difference. Saudi Arabia has been pinpointed as an influential player.
In doing my reporting for the story in The New York Times today on Saudi Arabia's latest maneuvers in climate treaty talks (they are reviving longstanding demands for compensation for lost oil revenue), I found an interesting paper on the oil kingdom's involvement in climate talks by Joanna Depledge, a research fellow at Cambridge University focusing on climate negotiations.
The paper, ``Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime,'' was published last November in the journal Global Environmental Politics. It is the most comprehensive analysis I've seen of the role that Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters have played through two decades of global climate diplomacy. Dr. Depledge's conclusion is that this is a classic case of parties--in this case Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states--getting involved in a process primarily to obstruct it. She concludes by noting hints that the oil powers appear to be shifting these days to a more constructive role.
But many observers and participants in the interim climate talks that concluded in Bangkok last week saw scant signs of a cooperative approach. And the e-mail and statements from Saudi officials that Jad Mouawad and I cited in our article appear to display a willingness by Saudi Arabia to impede a deal in Copenhagen if it does not include concrete commitments of aid and investment to offset anticipated drop in oil flows as countries try to cut emissions.
In an e-mail message to me, Dr. Depledge warned that Saudi Arabia and its lead official on climate, Mohammad al-Sabban, should not be underestimated as they pushed for financial commitments. ``I am absolutely sure that getting something on this will be a deal-breaker/maker for them,'' she wrote. ``They are quite blunt about it. It is the strategy they have followed since 1991.''
Dr. Depledge said she was hoping ``that getting something on investment'' in carbon capture and storage would ``provide a win-win way of getting them on board.''
``Al-Sabban is the most skillful and experienced negotiator in the process,'' she continued. ``Others ignore him at their peril.''
Access to the paper requires a subscription, so I will summarize its main points below. Here's part of the abstract:
A key starting point for the conduct of global negotiations under the U.N. system is that delegations are actively seeking an agreement that will meaningfully address the problem at hand. Sometimes, however, negotiations must contend with cases of obstructionism, that is, negotiators who are at the table with the aim of preventing an agreement. Given that they face no imperative of striking a deal, governments for whom ``no'' is the preferred outcome can have a disproportionately high impact on the negotiations, not only by formally blocking agreements, but on a day-to-day basis by slowing down progress or souring the atmosphere. This article examines Saudi Arabia's involvement in the climate change regime, and argues that the delegation has long played the role of obstructionist.
Dr. Depledge notes that Saudi Arabia and many other oil-exporting states only joined the Kyoto Protocol once it became clear it was going to take effect. ``Saudi Arabia acceded in time to ensure that it would become a party--and therefore able to fully influence proceedings,'' she wrote.
She described a significant contrast between the stances of Saudi Arabia and another developing country exporting fossil fuels--in this case South Africa and its coal:
Although the South African economy is more diversified than that of Saudi Arabia, it is still highly dependent on the coal sector. South Africa is the world's second-largest coal exporter, with developed countries accounting for 80 percent of its coal exports. South Africa is much poorer than Saudi Arabia, and coal is more vulnerable to climate policy than oil, given its higher carbon content and the greater availability of alternatives. South Africa, however, has adopted a more balanced view of the risks posed by climate change and mitigation measures, translating into a far more constructive role in the negotiations. Saudi Arabia has simply sought to prevent or slow down progress, either on the general thrust of the negotiations or on specific agenda items.
Dr. Depledge described signs of a shift in the oil kingdom's stance, including its endorsement of science pointing to big impacts from a building human influence on climate and commitment of money to pursue technologies for capturing carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels and other new energy options.
But her conclusion was still cautionary:
The question is whether, and if so how, these developments will eventually feed through to changes in the Saudi delegation's approach to the negotiations themselves, especially leading up to the landmark Copenhagen meeting in December 2009. For now (up to the June 2008 sessions), any signs of a softening in the Saudi negotiating position remained well hidden.
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The Worst of Friends: OPEC and G77 in the Climate Regime
(By Jon Barnett)
In the climate change negotiations the thirteen countries that are members of OPEC obstruct progress towards reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Although these actions undermine sustainable development in developing countries. the larger Group of 77 (G-77) coalition nevertheless tacitly supports its OPEC members in the climate regime. This article explains the connection between OPEC's interests in oil exports and its inaction on climate change, and the divergence of these interests with those of the G-77. It argues that OPEC's influence within the G-77, and therefore the climate regime, stems from the desire to maintain unity within the G-77. This unity has and is likely to continue to cost the majority of developing countries in the form delayed assistance for adaptation, the possibility of inadequate reduction in emissions under the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and continued dependence on increasingly expensive oil imports.
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Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime
(By Joanna Depledge)
The international relations literature often assumes that negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are cases, however, where a delegation may instead he ``striving for no,'' that is, participating with the aim of obstructing a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such cases of ``obstructionism,'' using the example of Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that regime, the delegation's negotiating tactics, strategies for addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be moving beyond obstruction.
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