Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
 
SUBJECT: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES
 
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN)

WITNESSES: PETER W. GALBRAITH, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY; GEOFFREY KEMP, THE NIXON CENTER; AND FRANK G. WISNER, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP

BODY:
SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As is often stated on the floor of the Senate, I'd like to associate myself with your remarks, in the interest of time. You've covered all or most of all I had planned on saying in my opening statement, and it will not surprise our witnesses we're in agreement, you and I, on this subject.

I would like to emphasize just two, maybe three points. One, is the poll results you cited are encouraging. I have been of the view, and you know this well -- you share the same view -- that the American people are prepared to do whatever they are told or convinced is in the interest of the United States, including making sacrifices. We are going to see more body bags come home. They're going to come in dribs and drabs, as we both, you and I, predicted last October. If we have only American uniforms guarding oil fields, guarding buildings, guarding checkpoints, guarding -- maintaining peace and order, it's inevitable. And it is a -- it's a heck of a price to pay, but it's an inevitable price to pay.

It's also going to cost us and the world community, God willing, if we do this right, billions of dollars. There's not enough oil in Iraq to provide for all of the needs, let alone the billeting of our troops in that country for the expected time. And that expected time, to most informed observers, is a whole lot more than a year, and less than 10. Everybody can argue in between, but nobody is any longer talking about being able to bring American forces home in the near term.

And -- which leads me to the primary point that I wish to make, and I hope our witnesses will speak to, and that is that, as I said, I firmly believe if you tell the American people the facts, they will do whatever it takes, and they're prepared to do it. One of the things that this notion about the -- Secretary Wolfowitz saying we cannot have unrealistic expectation, the American people have no real good expectation yet because they have not been told yet by the president or others what is likely to be expected of them, other than the generic phrase "well stay as long as it takes."

And we're soon going to find, I predict, that an awful lot of those National Guard units from Delaware, and Indiana, and California, and Wisconsin, and all over the United States who are there, who are now being extended for another six months, and eight months, and four months, you're going to find that in the neighborhoods back home, people are going to want a broader, clearer explanation of what is expected, and what it's going to take.

And so I'm going to ask at some point, not that any of the three are military experts, but what are the realistic expectations of how long we are going to be deeply involved -- whether that means with 75,000 forces, or where we have now over 160,000 forces, or whether that means with large numbers of deployed MPs or whatever it means, we ought -- just what is -- what are we talking about here? What do these three experts think we're talking about here in terms of duration, in broad terms? Broad terms. I'm not looking for someone to say 16 months and four days, or nine years and two months, but just in broad terms.

And the other point that I'd like to make and I'll cease, is before the war, we heard a great deal of discussion about the so- called democracy domino theory. And I'd like to hear our witnesses talk about what impact they think will occur in the region if we handle the situation in Iraq well, as it relates to democratization in the region, and what is the impact -- it's a version of what you said, Mr. Chairman -- if we do not get it right.

And most importantly, I'd like to know from these three men who I have inordinately -- an inordinate amount of respect for -- I mean, they've been before this committee, and I count two of them as personal friends, because I've known them longer and I've known the more intimately -- I'd like to know what you all think constitutes success in post-Saddam Iraq. What is it? Because we talk about democratization, we talk about stability, we talk about -- we use a lot of phrases, but I'm not sure what we really mean by what constitutes success.

For me, the notion of being able to have a democratic -- a liberal, democratic government in Iraq in the near term would be difficult even if the Lord Almighty came down and sat at the witness table and told us every single decision to make. I think it would be difficult even with divine guidance. But I do think it's possible to have a stable democracy, to paraphrase a delegate from Pennsylvania at the Continental Convention, that squints toward democracy, one that is -- that is more of a republic, that has a growing and sustained respect for human rights, for the rule of law, for the marketplace. And -- but I think that's a pretty tall order all by itself.

So, in conclusion, I'd like to get a sense at some point from the witnesses what they think constitutes, would constitute success in Iraq. And again, we have a number of specific questions, all of us. I really am grateful to the three of you for being here. We've called on you many times, and the record should note that the chairman and I and others on this committee call on you personally as well. Poor Dr. Kemp was sequestered in my office for about two or three hours this week, my asking his advice. I do the same with Peter. I've often done it with Frank. And so, your commitment to trying to get this right across party lines, in a bipartisan way, is something that is -- that is greatly appreciated and very much needed.

So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm anxious to hear our witnesses.

....

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, sir. Senator Biden.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you. As the three witnesses know, your answer to the chairman's last question has been a constant drum beat by the chairman and me and others in this committee for the last year. I would offer two observations and then ask some specific questions.

One, I think this town is a reflection, Dr. Kemp, of what hasn't happened. When the Berlin Wall came down, the intellectual institutions that were erected over the past 40 years remained, and everyone was looking for a job in effect. I'm not being facetious when I say that. We had a whole helluva lot of Soviet experts, a whole lot of Eastern European experts, a lot of arms control experts, a lot of very brilliant people who for 50 years guided our policy. We did not have the focus of the most significant minds in this country in and out of government focusing on the region we are now talking about. There were people who had expertise, but you didn't have entire think tanks and institutions built around just dealing with these issues we are now confronting. And it has taken time. I remember -- well, anyway -- so this has taken time. And I hope we speed it up a little bit.

And Dr. Kemp's comment that, concluding comment that we have to -- I'm paraphrasing -- we have to make a decision about whether we are going to move unilaterally or not, and that we may be able to unilaterally handle the front end, but the back end of the process we need help.

One of the things that I spent the last 12 months -- apparently falling on deaf ears in the administration -- is you can't expect the back end if you don't have some discussion on the front end. The idea that we can unilaterally decide where we want to change the world, and then after the fact go out to the rest of the world and say, now, by the way, you clean it up with us, and you take on a major responsibility in doing it. They may do it, because they have no choice because of the chaos that may be left if we don't do it and they are left with it. But it sure would be a hell of -- a heck of a lot better had we had a thing called diplomacy at the front end of this process, which I think was sorely lacking -- which leads me to a point I want to make for the -- relative to the last hearing, this hearing and future hearings. Speaking only for myself, but I suspect it may be for the committee, who may share a similar view -- when we discuss with you, as we will today and in the future, why we were so unprepared for the post-Saddam period, it is not to assign blame. It is not to say, Aha, I told you so -- you didn't do what you were supposed to do -- you failed. That is not the purpose. At least it's not my purpose. The answer to that question as to why we were so woefully unprepared -- although there were some serious successes -- the oil fields are basically intact, people are not starving, there's not major exoduses, there's not major flight, and there is not major recriminations that are going on at the moment. So there are genuine successes. But why we were so unprepared, the answer to that question is important because -- not because we need to assign blame, but to determine whether there is an ideological impediment to this notion of nation-building that exists among very important people in this administration. The people who are -- who have been primarily in charge are very, very, very bright people -- among the most informed and brightest people I've dealt with in 30 years as a senator. It's not that they could not have known what the Council recommended in a number of its areas, including establishing stability and the need for, on page three of your executive summary, or on page five of the first report to the Council, establishing law and order. There's no one in this administration who could have failed to understand that. They're not tone deaf.

And what I'm trying to get at, the reason I keep pursuing this, is look at Afghanistan. I'm not saying anything out of school. Dr. Rice has said it personally -- I mean, publicly. When I would meet with her once a week back when I was the chairman, we were pushing, many of us in this committee for expanding the international security force beyond Kabul, so there was something other than that there was a prospect that Mr. Karzai would be something other than the mayor of Kabul. We talked in great detail about the need for all the aid to go through his hands, so he had something to disseminate in Herat, or something to disseminate in other parts of the country, that there was some reason for the warlords needing him.

I remember midway through this debate, after we lost the debate and the State Department lost the debate on expanding the ISAF and making it more muscular and so on and so forth, Dr. Rice said, There is stability. I said, Yeah, specifically, Ishmael Khan is in control of Herat. She said, Yes, there's stability. That was a definition of stability. That was the objective. And then told that that country has never been able to be controlled by a central government.

So what I am trying to get at here -- I want to make sure you understand the context of my questions -- is I think there is a great ideological divide here among the neoconservatives and the rest of the administration and many of us as to what is doable and what is the objective, because I can't for the life of me believe that the leading lights in this administration didn't understand the very things that the Council and each of you have recommended ahead of time as to what were the glaring deficiencies. And so that's the context in which I ask the questions here, is whether or not we are running up against a need for a change in the predominant thinking of the administration in order to get the job done, or whether or not there is a consistency that we only need to tweak a little bit here.

Now, toward that end, let me go specifically to my questions. The idea of the involvement of NATO, the EU and the United Nations -- you have all mentioned them being involved in one way or another. Can any of you be specific with me other than in State Department terms, which are bland, impressive and have little content terms, of telling me precisely what role do you look for for NATO? Should NATO comprise -- NATO forces comprise 50 percent of the, quote, "occupying forces"? Should they comprise 75 percent? Should we be sharing as we did in Bosnia, having a military commander who is an American, but making up only 15 percent of -- I mean in Kosovo -- making up only 15 percent of the forces? Are we talking about -- is it have we already met the goal of involving NATO because we have got the Poles and the Brits there? I'm of the view this administration would tell me we already have NATO involved, so. So what do you mean by NATO involvement?

The second question is: What kinds of -- I think again, Dr. Kemp, you said -- you all reflected the same thing that Dr. Kemp said, which was that there is a need for there to be -- this has to be internationalized more. I assume you mean that in terms of decisions on governance within Iraq.

When I speak to our interlocutors in France, Germany, even Great Britain, Spain, Italy, they basically say, Look, you want us in on the deal. We've got to have -- and I think it was your phrase, Dr. Kemp -- I may be mistaken -- we are going to have to in effect yield complete dominance on every decision of consequence that's made. There has to be some -- some input that they have. And the -- and with regard to Iran, and I'll come back in a second round, because I have some very -- but with regard to Iran, I had an opportunity to spend some time with Dr. Kemp, and I've had some time in the past with Ambassador Wisner to talk about Iran, there seems to me to be an absolute -- and it goes back to this ideological divide that I perceive that exists in the administration -- and absolute -- put it another way. I believe that if tomorrow the reformers prevail in Iran, and established what we would call a democracy along the lines of an Islamic state like Turkey, that that new democratic government would be unwilling to give up its nuclear capacity; that it would be unwilling -- there is no government I can perceive in Iran that would voluntarily say, You know, we're in a rough neighborhood here, and the idea of us having the ability some day to have a nuclear capability is something we're going to forswear. And so any negotiation with Iran seems to me forces any administration to come face to face with how do you not eliminate, but how do you constrain, control and/or have total transparency about any nuclear program? And that to me, from my discussions with leaders in this administration, and the last administration as well, a nonstarter. You cannot start with that as being something that may end up being at the end of the negotiation. Therefore no discussion.

So if you could speak to me about any of what I have raised, and then I'll come back in a second round to pursue -- because I realize what I've asked you cannot be answered in a very -- pick any piece of it to respond to, I'd appreciate it.

MR. KEMP: I'll just respond on the nuclear Iran, and maybe my colleagues will add on the other points. Senator, this is a critical issue, because I think first we have to be very clear by what we mean about Iran's nuclear program. I mean, at the moment -- we'll know more on June the 16th when the IAEA governors meet to decide whether or not Iran has violated any of its NPT commitments -- but there is an important distinction between an Iranian nuclear program that includes all the infrastructure for a full fuel cycle and an Iranian nuclear weapon.

SEN. BIDEN: Agree. I meant an Iranian nuclear structure -- not an Iranian nuclear weapon.

MR. KEMP: Right. Well, my argument would be that if Iran had turned into Turkey, we could live with an Iranian nuclear infrastructure that was on IAEA safeguards, and Iran had signed the additional protocols. I think that would be far less dangerous for instance than the current situation we have in Pakistan, where we have a government that is not under any safeguards, that is ruled by a military dictator who could be overthrown at any time. So I would be more comfortable, frankly, with a reformed Iran that still had a nuclear potential than a regime in Teheran that conducts terrorism and has not signed the additional protocols.

But clearly how the United States thinks a putative Iranian nuclear capability has to be a function of other things the Iranian government is doing in its foreign policy, particularly terrorism and how it deals with Iraq and Afghanistan. If they reconfigured their foreign policy in a way that was acceptable to us on those issues, I think we could be more laid back about the nuclear infrastructure issue.

MR. WISNER: Peter, forgive me, I'm jumping in right here on the tail end of Geoff Kemp's remarks about Iran and the nuclear issue. I think perhaps I see it a bit differently. I agree with Geoff that what we have before us is an extraordinarily dangerous situations. The Iranians are developing capabilities that could day be weaponized. The question is: Will they weaponize them, and what will deter them from weaponization?

At the heart of the matter, whether they see eye to eye with us politically or they do not, or they change their policies, this problem is going to continue to exist. I think it's very important therefore to focus with the Iranians in dialogue with the Iranians on fixing the inspection regime, increasing the safeguards, going to 93- plus-2, making it clear that understanding that we cannot live with a process that goes to weaponization, that in the context of progress on other fronts we will not be able to turn our back on -- the Iranians will continue to have a capability. But we are going to live with ambiguity with the Iranians, whatever happens in the end. And I think the best we can move for at the moment is to intensify the internationalization, the safeguards, and introduce 93-plus-2.

As to your first point, I would frankly welcome NATO being as early as possible a player in the Iraq front, starting with logistics and planning functions, moving to command functions, increasing the numbers of forces, and would associate myself with your wish in that regard. But let's not lose sight of the fact the objective is to put security in the hands of Iraqis, and to train and equip police and Iraqi security forces.

SEN. BIDEN: Let's not lose sight of the fact that in every place we've tried to do that it's taken years and years. So anybody who thinks this is going to occur in six months or eight months, I'm willing to bet my career that they're wrong.

MR. WISNER: The rate we turn out Afghan battalions, you are absolutely right. (Laughter.)

SEN. BIDEN: The rate we did it in Bosnia, the rate we did it in Kosovo, the rate we did it anywhere is on a very tough deal.

MR. WISNER: But, true enough, at the same time, if we don't start now, and start with large numbers, we won't reach the objective. International forces, in short, will not be the final arbiter of Iraqi security.

The second point --

SEN. BIDEN: But on that point, though, I mean, international forces will not be the final arbiter. But can we get to the final arbiter without international forces?

MR. WISNER: No, we have to --

SEN. BIDEN: And internationalizing the force. That's really the question now. I mean, that's the next piece here, isn't it?

MR. WISNER: I'm fully in agreement, and therefore the role that I briefly outlined for NATO makes a great deal of sense.

SEN. LUGAR: Trying to get perhaps to Senator Alexander before we have a break, in fairness, so he can get into this situation, because we'll be coming back. Senator Alexander.

....

SEN. LUGAR : Thank you for those insights. Let me note that the Senate's ranking member has just returned, and I want to recognize him as I've had the monopoly of all you for much more than my allotted 10 minutes. Let me just ask the ranking Member, after you've raised questions and answers, it's my intent to adjourn the hearing. I've had a good opportunity and wanted to make certain that you do, too.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry I got -- there's a dangerous no-man's land for United States' Senators, and that's between the Floor and the elevators. And I was importuned by a number of reporters on matters that were beyond my competence to respond to. And the more I told them I didn't know, the more they asked questions and believed I knew something. But at any rate, if the Chairman went to any of these issues, please just let me know and I will literally read the record.

With regard to the role of the United Nations, if you can, in as specific terms as you can, had you Ambassador Bremer's job right now, you're sitting in his spot, what would you recommend specifically to the President about further U.N. involvement, if you would? Anyone.

MR. GALBRAITH: I think my own preference would actually have been to put all this under a U.N. mandate. I mean, beyond what was in the resolution. But I think there are some discrete things that the United Nations can do. The most important, in my view, relates to the area of justice. This really requires impartiality. And I think that is much more likely to come from the United Nations or be seen as coming from the United Nations. I think the United States, of course, can be impartial as well. But I think it is better if it is seen as coming from the United Nations.

SEN. BIDEN: When you say justice, you mean a judicial system?

MR. GALBRAITH: I mean two things. One of them is the judicial system. So I would bring in the United Nations and give them the task of vetting judges. In fact, I think basically you have to get rid of all the old Iraqi judges. I mean, they -- this was a -- they administered injustice for 35 years, and I don't think you can credibly have a new beginning with people who have done that. So a process of identifying and recruiting new judges. There are a lot of capable Iraqi judges. I think it is doable. I would -- and then training. I would then also let the United Nations do the documentation of the crimes that took place under the Ba'ath regime. And in my view I think ideally I would have an international criminal tribunal to try people. I know that this administration is not keen on such things, but it is such an open-and-shut case that we really ought to take it to the entire world, and we have a number of the senior leaders. I think we ought to try them in Iraq, but before a U.N.-mandated tribunal. Incidentally, people complain about these trials as being long and slow. The fact -- and I may be testifying later this week in the Milosevic trial, which is -- or next -- later this month -- which has gone on for more than a year. The fact is that genocide is a very complicated crime, and it's not a discreet murder case. You know, you have a perpetrator and a victim and a handful of witnesses and some gunpowder. And if you were trying to try somebody for the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, that is a very big task, and I think it's no surprise that this takes a long period of time. But I think it is important to do that, and that is a role I also would assign to the United Nations.

There are other things that the United Nations is doing in Iraq, in the development area, in the humanitarian assistance. Obviously those kinds of activities should continue. And I would urge the United States, the president, Ambassador Bremer, to take advantage of the very special skills of Sergio Vieira de Mello. It was the United States who wanted him in that job. He really will be very capable at helping to forge a political consensus. This is what he has done his entire career.

SEN. BIDEN: Let me -- and I'm going to ask the others to comment too, but let me specifically ask you about the last point. Forging a political consensus really means being part of forging a new government in Iraq, an Iraqi government. Now, how does in the present circumstance a U.N. representative within the constraints of the resolution that he is operating under now, how does he or any other U.N. personnel get involved in that process? One of the things that I have believed for a long time, and I am happily disabused of the notion if it's warranted that I be disabused of it -- is that there are conflicting, genuinely conflicting interests here on our part. One is to get the heck out as possibly quick as we can in terms of being the face of the Iraqi government. And two is making sure we don't move so fast that we end up leaving a government in place that does not have any reasonable prospect of developing into a quasi- democratic institution. We have several models. We have the model we tried to pursue in Bosnia, which you are extensively familiar with, where when we went to elections, quickly in my view, we guaranteed that the most extreme nationalists in each of the competing factions would become the representative of that portion of the population -- no time to develop any new or more moderate blood, if you will. We have an example in Bosnia -- I mean in Kosovo. We have an example in Afghanistan where the world community under our leadership met in Germany with a group of Afghanis, somewhat boisterous and somewhat contentious, but it resulted in a consensus pick by the vast majority at that moment of the varying factions within Afghanistan of a single man who was going to transition to a pluralistic government in time.

I don't know what the plan here is. I don't know what the mechanism we are looking at here is. So what I'm really -- when you say to me that we get the diplomatic skills and the negotiating skills of a particularly talented diplomat assigned by the United Nations to this process, how does he or anyone else get in the game? Should he be sitting in the room with Bremer? Should they be now talking about what is the outline and the steps to be taken to transition to an Iraqi control of Iraq? I mean, how does this in mechanical ways happen?

MR. GALBRAITH: These are extremely good questions. I think that Sergio Vieira de Mello probably should be playing a supporting role to what Bremer is doing, and I think it's very likely that is what he is doing. In some instances he definitely should be in the room. In other instances he ought to be tag-teaming with Bremer, meeting with the different Iraqis, helping in this process of trying to find a consensus.

You've touched on something which I should have said, which actually is terribly important, which is, What is the -- leads to the question of, What is the exit strategy? My view of the process is you establish a provisional government as quickly as possible, accepting your point not wanting to do it too quickly, and not wait too longer either; but establish provisional government as quickly as possible, by some kind of loya jirga process, which I think actually worked very well in Afghanistan; and then move to elections. And here's another role I think for the United Nations. The United Nations has a lot of experience in conducting elections in post-conflict situations, and I think does it extremely well. And again, I think the result is likely to be more widely accepted if done by the United Nations.

I think the analogy to Bosnia is not a good one.

SEN. BIDEN: I'm not suggesting that any of these are analogous --

MR. GALBRAITH: No, but -- no --

SEN. BIDEN: I'm just saying --

MR. GALBRAITH: But this is raised continuously. The problem in Bosnia was that the -- it was the product, as you know, of a peace treaty in which the power in November and December of 1995 still rested with Tudjman, Milosevic, and the parties in Bosnia. NATO came in, and over time began -- and the High Representative -- began to increase their power. And in that context I agree that it probably would have been better for the elections to be delayed until they had had -- they had done more, they had helped reshape some of the mentality, and they had arrested some of the war criminals. This is a completely different situation. The coalition has basically all the -- the military forces have all the power, and I think that we then are being blamed for the shortcomings, some of which we could do better, and some of which are inevitable. I think in turning this over to Iraqis in some kind of coalition government -- and here's they've looked at a Bosnia type of model of rotating -- you know, take three top positions -- Kurd, Shi'ite, Sunni -- but some type of coalition like that does make sense. The one caveat I would have on it, and it's a big one -- the one thing I would be concerned about is that this government that might come in, a kind of provisional government reflecting the Iraqi political leadership, may -- you know, is going to have a rough time, and it may become quite unpopular. And when the elections are held, then the more extreme elements, and particularly the religious parties, may campaign against that government, because it hasn't delivered -- and even if we'd done everything right, it was not going to be able to deliver. People have very unrealistic expectations in these circumstances, but I don't know how you solve that problem. I think the worst alternative is for the United States to continue to govern Iraq.

SEN. BIDEN: Gentlemen, would you each comment on that for me?

MR. KEMP: I have very little to add to what Peter said, and it's not something I am intimately familiar with. I would only suggest that in an area where perhaps an international hand, U.N. or otherwise, might be advisable at some point concerns the central issue of the oil industry and who is going to control it and how the money is going to flow, because that is the issue that all the neighborhood is worried about, and there are all these conspiracy theories that that was the reason we went there. And ultimately how the oil wealth of Iraq is distributed will make or break all these proposals for federation or confederation.

So I would argue that some U.N. involvement in the management of the financing of the oil industry is going to be important to convince the donors we want to bring into Iraq from around the world that this is an above-board operation, and that they have nothing to worry about, and that there is transparency.

SEN. BIDEN: Ambassador Wisner?

MR. WISNER: Senator, I think the main points have been made. Let me go back to a remark of Peter's and focus on it for just a moment. I think the starting point is to revise our policy a bit. Of course the coalition is responsible right now for reestablishing law and order, for setting in place the essential feeding and infrastructure services, getting the oil back up and running. But I'd like to think that it would become the policy of the United States to shift the visible responsibility towards the United Nations, and that means at the moment that Sergio de Mello, who is a terrifically capable, smart man, would begin in very close consultations with Mr. Bremer, taking -- working through the steps that have to be taken in the Iraqi political process. And assuming a greater and greater responsibility, to the point that when you move from an advisory council to an interim government, from an interim government to a constituent assembly, the U.N. umbrella over the operation becomes more and more visible.

I argue that because a U.N. umbrella, a U.N. tone, will bring in fact the practical advantages that Mr. Galbraith talked about -- the practical advantages of real experience. But, more importantly, it legitimizes the political process in the minds of the Iraqis, in the eyes of Arabs, and around the world, and it allows the United States to play its role behind the scene. We are going to have to be very careful in Iraq that the wrong people don't emerge in the political process -- people we can't deal with, people who will subvert the very principles we believe in and went to war for. But it is better if we exercise that veto behind the stage rather than on stage. Having the U.N. out front is exactly where we ought to be. So I would argue basic principle, begin to shift the responsibility for the political development away from a coalition and towards a U.N. responsibility.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, I -- my observation is there are only two -- there are only two places in Iraq where there has been over the last decade an ability for there to develop any political leadership. One has been in the Kurdish-controlled areas, and Senator Hagel and I spent some time up there, and it was remarkable the progress they made under the no-fly zone with revenues, let alone, the number of hospitals, schools, et cetera -- I mean, literally the quality of life -- and the mosques and the religious leaders within the mosques. And so I don't know any other place in Iraq where you are likely to find in the near term, meaning months, indigenous groups, individuals or leadership beginning to flourish or show the ability to participate. And it seems to me that -- well, I shouldn't -- that's my concern about how quickly we transition. And the second concern is yours, Peter, is that unless we have in the meantime, in my view, established stability, order, security, gotten the major infrastructure up and running and functioning, that whatever that transition or whatever government you want to call it, when it comes time for elections is going to be the whipping boy for the more radical elements within the country, establishing the very state that Ambassador Wisner is by implication concerned about. We don't want the "wrong people," quote/unquote, end up running Iraq. That will not -- we'll not let that happen -- then all then we will be viewed as is having illegitimately dethroned the process that we were essentially attempting to establish in the first place. So it leads me to this question: Is the -- we ought to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time -- I understand that. I'm not suggesting that we can only do one thing at a time. But is the most urgent need establishing order, safe streets, the ability of people -- I am told that Iraqi police officers will not show up at their police stations on duty, because they are fearful that they will be killed on the way; that they will literally, literally, there is such a lack of sense of safety on the street that even those police officers we're trying to develop and bring back are reluctant to go on post. And as part of that question, how important is it that we produce the body? How important is it that Saddam Hussein be determined with certainty to be dead or alive in captivity? Because there is a stretch of a parallel, Peter. As long as Karadzic, as long as those boys were wandering the countryside in Bosnia, in Srpska, the ability of actually being able to get anything really done was I think nonexistent. I realize it's not the same, but if you read the press accounts of folks on the ground in Iraq, like you were for three weeks, the ghost of Saddam Hussein seems to loom very large in terms of the chances people are willing to take to begin to build this new Iraq. And you have Chalabi before your organization, Frank, up in New York -- I think it was in New York -- didn't he speak to the Council?

MR. WISNER: Mmm-hmm. (Affirming.)

SEN. BIDEN: Saying that he's sure Saddam Hussein is not only alive and well, but that he is orchestrating and paying for and coordinating these attacks on American soldiers and the killings that are taking place. And, if I'm not mistaken, I thought I heard him say in an interview yesterday that he believed that Saddam has this plan in place from the beginning, that it was not -- there was a decided decision not to resist in any meaningful way, quote, "the invasion," because he couldn't, and so there was already this plan was made at the same time to be able to engage in essentially guerrilla warfare once we were in occupation. Now, I don't know if that's urban lore or whether it's real, but how much of that is absorbed in Iraq by Iraqis as fact, and how does it affect conduct or participation?

MR. GALBRAITH: Well, you raise a lot of issues. First, I'd like to just come to the point you made about the two sources of leadership, and you are completely right. You have the Kurds and you have the mosques, and it was very apparent to me going to what was Saddam City, now Al-Sader City and to Karbala, you know, within a week of the takeover that the mosques have filled the gap. They have come in. There were armed men on the streets providing security in Karbala. They were picking up the garbage, and they were restructuring the school curriculum.

The trouble is if we delay a long time in setting up a provisional Iraqi government, will another leadership, alternative leadership, develop? I'm not sure that that's the case. So -- and I'm not sure that -- and there is the problem if we go with our favorite exiles, who some of whom -- they are talented people, and they shouldn't be belittled. And, incidentally, they stayed with this --

SEN. BIDEN: I am not belittling them.

MR. GALBRAITH: But you've seen the kind of suggestion that Chalabi is a (salvo row ?) -- you know, revolutionary. A lot of these people took significant personal risks, and they pursued a cause when it basically seemed hopeless. But there is the problem if they are there, if you put a provisional government there, will that strengthen the radical alternative? I think these are some of the reasons why in fact the federal system is very much in our interests, so that if certain parts of Iraq become more radicalized, so there will be anchors that will not. And Kurdistan is clearly going to be a moderate secular, very pro-American region, which it is. It's probably the most pro-American place in the world.

On the question of the body, I think again there's a different between the Karadzic/Mladic case and the Saddam case in that Karadzic and Mladic were genuine heroes to a real constituency in the Bosnia Serb Republican, and indeed in Serbia itself. I think Saddam is much more a discredited figure, and this comes to the issue Senator Lugar had raised, I think in your absence, about public diplomacy. This is another reason why it's so important that we get the record out about this regime, because I think it -- on the killings and the corruption -- because I think that will serve to further undermine his support.

SEN. BIDEN: If I could refine my point slightly, I did not believe and do not believe that Saddam Hussein has a constituency. I think Saddam Hussein is mortally feared by all constituencies. And so my question really was: Absent producing the body, and the urban lore that he's alive and well and coordinating attacks, does that prevent people who disliked him, hated him, or people who would otherwise be willing to cooperate and prepare to transition a new government, does that keep them on the sidelines out of fear that the man is coming back?

MR. GALBRAITH: I think that -- I think the answer to that largely is no. I think it has a limited scope in the so-called Sunni- Arab triangle, you know the Faluja to Tikrit, Samara, some of the Sunni areas of Baghdad. But other than that -- and there are plenty of people who are coming forward in those areas. But other than that, I think people accept that he is gone. That was clearly true in the initial period as we were advancing toward Baghdad, but I think a lot of that had to do with what happened in 1991 and a sense that the United States, here it is, it is encouraging us Shi'ites to rebel again. Will it let us down again with the horrific consequences? I think people are -- people now understand that Saddam is gone and that the U.S. is there.

MR. WISNER: Senator, your first question was, Is law and order the overriding objective? I'd like to argue that, bluntly, yes is the answer, but yes but, and that is law and order must be improved. Adequate coalition forces have got to be available, Iraqis brought into positions of security responsibility, intelligence services, the rest -- all have to be near-term objectives for the coalition.

At the same time, adequate security is linked to politics. To get a political framework in which the component parts of Iraq feel that they are going to get a hearing and it will be responsible, will be consulted, will be contributing to the future of their own country, gives the security forces legitimacy.

We cannot be the government. And therefore, moving down the road as fast as circumstances permit to create a political authority seems to me connected very directly to the issue of law and order.

Second, on the question --

SEN. BIDEN: Was Bremer right in postponing the commitment made by Garner about transitioning?

MR. WISNER: In my judgment, he was. But what bothers me is that there now is not a view of where we go next and who will be involved and what will be the rules of the road. So we've ended one. We've talked about a short-term -- ended one formula, a short-term interim advisory council. But a point I tried to make in my opening remarks, the issue of vision, of where we're going, so that Iraqis understand what the rules will be, that remains to be set out.

I would add just quickly on that point, I'm not quite -- I'm not totally discouraged about the sources of leadership in Iraq. It's not just Kurds and mosques. Iraq is a remarkable country. The depth of education exceeded that virtually in any Arab country. There are substantial numbers of high-quality academics, professionals. There are people who performed ably in the civil service. And then there are the traditional elements of Iraqi power, the tribal structures, not all of which were necessarily corrupt, were necessarily fully corrupted by the Ba'ath regime.

In short, how you bring these constructive elements to the table is part of the political process that I would like to see the U.N. share in. And I'd just add as well that if you talk, as I'm sure Peter and Geoff have, to Iraqi Shi'a, there are many who say they see the importance of dividing the mosque and the state and that there are intellectuals, businessmen, professionals who are deeply devout who can speak on behalf of the mosque but are not themselves clerics.

I think Iraq, properly consulted, brought forward carefully, watching who is of real quality and has respect in the community, could actually produce a leadership that would do credit to it and to our efforts.

MR. KEMP: I have very little to add, Senator Biden, except to embellish your first point. I mean, I think we all said in different ways at the beginning of this hearing that we do not want to repeat in Iraq what has happened in Afghanistan. And essentially if indeed President Karzai is still the mayor of Kabul, it is because there is not law and order outside the law, and that therefore the security issue obviously has to be the number one priority. Without security, you cannot rebuild infrastructure. And until you really rebuild infrastructure, you can't regenerate the economy and get people work and jobs and be more content.

The situation we do not want to be in is months from now, if Iraqis are asked, "Were you better off six months ago than you are today?" and they answer in the positive, then we will be in trouble, because if you read the press reports, if you read an extraordinary report that the International Crisis Group issued yesterday about the day-to-day conditions in Baghdad as we enter the summer months, it really is, I think, quite disturbing. And therefore I would say that has to be Ambassador Bremer's number one priority.

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have many more questions, but I'll have many more opportunities, and I won't trespass on your time anymore. I thank you for very, very helpful testimony.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Biden. And I join you in thanking our witnesses. Each of the papers you presented were really very important contributions, and I hope that they will have wider circulation than simply the testimony before this committee today. We thank you for being so forthcoming in your responses. And we look forward to seeing you again, if not soon on this issue, on various other areas of American foreign policy.

The hearing is adjourned.