Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2006

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The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN], for himself and Mr. Lugar, proposes an amendment numbered 1301.

The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide support to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission and to provide an offset)

On page 169, line 4, strike ``$3,036,375,000'' and insert ``$3,031,375,000''.

On page 190, line 5, strike ``$440,100,000'' and insert ``$445,100,000''.

On page 190, line 19, insert ``that should be not less than $19,350,000'' after ``Commission''.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know we are about to vote at 2:30 on two amendments. I wanted this to be the pending business. I will lay this aside until after the successive votes we are about to have. I thank the Chair.

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Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, an important part of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is the continuing effort to deter other countries from testing a nuclear weapon. It is often said that a country could build a relatively simple nuclear weapon, like the bomb exploded at Hiroshima, and use it with confidence even though it has not tested the device. That does not hold true, however, for more complex designs; and military commanders are loath to rely upon any weapon that has not been tested.

One major way to deter countries from conducting nuclear weapons tests is to ensure that such a test would be detected. That's because most countries, as signers of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the CTBT, are bound to refrain from acts that would undermine the object and purpose of that treaty, even though it has yet to enter into force. In addition, nearly all nuclear weapons states, including some that are not parties to the CTBT, have proclaimed unilateral moratoria on nuclear weapons tests. Thus, there are both legal and political barriers to openly testing nuclear weapons.

How can we make it more likely that a covert nuclear weapons test would be detected and identified? One way is through U.S. and allied data collection, including the fine seismic network put together by the Air Force Technical Applications Center, or AFTAC. I support and applaud the work of AFTAC, which is truly a center of excellence. But AFTAC cannot and does not do everything; not every country will cooperate with the United States in the nuclear detection mission; and when we use AFTAC, we pay the full bill.

AFTAC's work is supplemented importantly by the International Monitoring System, or IMS, that is being set up by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization, the CTBTO PrepCom. The worldwide seismic network of the IMS will include sites in Russia, China, Iran and elsewhere that cannot be duplicated through U.S. or bilateral arrangements. It will also combine long-distance, low-frequency, or teleseismic, coverage with high-frequency, regional seismic data that many experts believe will do a better job of detecting a ``decoupled'' explosion that uses an existing cavity to resist detection.

The IMS will marshal four different types of data--not only seismic, but also hydroacoustic, infrasound, and airborne radionuclide emissions--collected at 321 sites, mostly seismic arrays. The use of multiple methodologies will make it more difficult for a country to evade detection, as it gets very difficult to design a test that avoids detection by all four means. And the rest of the world is paying more than three quarters of the cost of this robust monitoring system.

Finally, while national technical means may include very sensitive intelligence information, the IMS will provide data that can be used openly for diplomatic or enforcement purposes. That will greatly ease the pressure on U.S. intelligence to expose sensitive sources or methods in order to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The administration rightly supports the IMS and has funded the U.S. share of IMS expenses for several years. Secretary of State Rice confirmed the administration's support for this program earlier this year, in response to a question for the record that I asked after she testified on the foreign affairs budget.

In addition, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Mr. Joseph, has assured the Foreign Relations Committee that funding the IMS is fully consistent with the administration's position on the CTBT, which it has said that the United States will not join, even though it is a signatory to the treaty. While I wish that the administration were of a different mind on the CTBT itself, I think they are absolutely correct in their view that the IMS serves our national security interests even if this country never ratifies the CTBT.

Unfortunately, the Office of Management and Budget imposed a severe cut on this budget item, reducing the State Department's request from $22,000,000 to $14,350,000. The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department is committed to finding the extra funds, even if they have to be obtained in the fiscal year 2007 budget. That's no way to run a railroad, however, and it could be difficult to get over $30 million next year to make up for the shortfall. It would be far better to find some of that extra money now and not put the United States so far in arrears.

I propose, therefore, that an extra $5 million be made available for the U.S. contribution to the CTBTO PrepCom. I am joined in this amendment by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, my good friend Senator LUGAR of Indiana, which I very much appreciate. The additional funds will make it much more likely that the United States will find the money to pay its full assessment for IMS and will help keep the world from becoming a much more dangerous place.

Staff to Senators MCCONNELL and LEAHY have kindly worked with us on this amendment and identified the budget for economic support funds as an area in which a $5 million cut could be absorbed with less harm to our national security than we would risk by failing to fund the IMS in a timely manner. I understand that the managers of this bill are prepared to accept our amendment and can cover the difference in first-year outlays that will result. I am most grateful for their cooperation.

I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD the following question and answer.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator Joseph Biden (No. 12), Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2005.

Question: Why is the Administration proposing a cut in the U.S. contribution to the International Monitoring System being established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission?

Answer: The $7.65 million cut in funding for the International Monitoring System (IMS) does not signal a change in U.S. policy toward the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The U.S. continues to support and participate in those activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) in Vienna that pertain to the IMS, and the U.S. has no plans to press the PrepCom to lower its budget to a level commensurate with the $14.35 million that the Administration has allocated for it in FY06.

Unfortunately, budgets are very tight and cuts had to be made, even among programs supported by the Administration. A number of other cuts were made in the Department's program requests, including in the areas of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The level of funding for a program in any given year's budget does not necessarily have a bearing on the funding level for that program in the succeeding years.

It is important to note that the U.S. continues to observe a nuclear testing moratorium and encourages other states not to test. While the U.S. does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to it, the U.S. has gone to great expense to develop a Stockpile Stewardship Program to help ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile without testing.

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